Attacks on host computers by malicious peripherals are a growing problem; the inexorable advance of powerful, small, cheap peripherals, which attach to plug-and-play buses, has made such attacks easy to mount. At the same time, commodity operating systems lack systematic defenses.
Introduction
Peripheral devices are now powerful, portable, and plentiful: we have all received inexpensive "conference USB sticks" that include not only the stored conference proceedings but also a complete computer. Given this trend, malicious peripheral devices are easy to create and difficult to defend against. Consider a user who is induced to insert a malicious USB stick into his or her laptop [108, 149] . While following the USB specifications, the malicious device can masquerade as a keyboard. The device can then use its keystroke-producing ability to install a virus or exfiltrate files [15, 55, 138, 159] .
As another example, a USB device can eavesdrop on the communication between another device (say, the user's true keyboard) and the host. This requires compromising a hub (or deploying a malicious one), but such attacks exist [11, 16, 26, 92] . The device could then store a trace of the key strokes, generate a hotplug event (again while obeying the specification), transform into a newly attached keyboard, and then exfiltrate as above. A third example is a malicious device exploiting vulnerabilities in the host's drivers or system software [96, 105, 107, 112] .
These problems are going to get worse. On the next generation of laptops, the power port will be USB [4, 10] , which means that any of the attacks above could be carried out by a malicious charger. For that matter, you might be carrying around a compromised phone right now, if you borrowed a USB charger from the wrong person.
Existing technology addresses aspects of the problem, but as far as we know, there is no unified response. For example, IOMMU hardware, hardware-assisted I/O virtualization, device drivers in user space, device drivers in virtual machines, device drivers with reference monitors, and formally verified device drivers would all help contain a device, in terms of its memory accesses and effects on other host software ( §2.3). However, these techniques and mechanisms do not directly address semantic attacks (for example, masquerading or eavesdropping). Existing hotplug control frameworks enable users to express that certain devices should be denied access (a notable example is udev on Linux; on other commodity OSes, the case is similar or worse). However, access is all-or-nothing, decisions are based upon the device's claimed identity (rather than its ongoing behavior), and a malicious device can easily disarm the enforcement mechanism ( §2. 3) .
We believe that the underlying issue here is a missing piece: I/O subsystems in commodity operating systems have no organizing abstraction that could serve as a natural foundation for security features. This paper attempts to fill that void. 1 Our point of departure is a simple suggestion: rather than design a new framework, why not arrange for attached peripheral devices on commodity OSes to appear to the kernel as if they were untrusted network endpoints? Then, users and administrators could deploy a rich and well-studied toolbox from network security-firewalls, packet cleaning, VPNs, DPIs, etc.-to defend the computer systematically. Our animating hope is that a system based on this picture would eliminate large classes of vulnerabilities, be easy to deploy, and enable new functionality. Validating and investigating this potential is our mission in this paper. To that end, we describe the design, implementation, and experimental evaluation of a system called Cinch.
Cinch begins with two requirements:
• Peripheral buses (for example, USB) must somehow look "remote", even though they are physically coupled to the rest of the computer.
• Users and administrators need to be able to concisely express-and conveniently enforce-rich policies about which flows are allowed, and the content of those flows, between the "remote" bus and the protected computer.
In addition, Cinch takes the following pragmatic approach to compatibility:
• Cinch must not require re-design or re-implementation of bus standards, motherboards, operating systems, or driver stacks. Any of these would be massive undertakings, would have to be done for multiple platforms, and would jettison the immense effort behind today's installed base.
• Modifications to peripheral devices are acceptable; the modifications must obey the relevant bus standard and be straightforward to implement. The types of changes that we have in mind were prototyped by a single person in less than two days ( §4); furthermore, they can be applied to unmodified legacy devices via an inexpensive adapter.
Cinch works as follows; its current implementation is targeted to USB ( §3.1). Under Cinch, USB devices are attached to a logically separate, untrusted machine. That machine tunnels USB traffic to the protected machine over IP. Observe that this forces USB traffic through a narrow and hardened interface (IP processing), which serves as a choke point. Cinch deploys a gateway at this choke point, which enforces the policy preferences of the user or administrator. After the traffic passes through this gateway, Cinch presents it to the operating system as an idealized USB device. To create the untrusted machine-and enforce its separation-the protected machine uses hardware support for virtualizing I/O [89, 91] ; in particular, the peripheral devices can directly interact only with the untrusted machine, not the protected one.
To showcase the architecture, we build several example applications ( §3.2). First, we configure the gateway so that untrusted devices can communicate only with the protected machine's power subsystem (and the idea is that, as developers, we would harden the power subsystem); to communicate with other I/O subsystems (user input, etc.), the device must be authenticated. This brings us to the second example, in which the gateway authenticates the device (perhaps via an external root of trust such as a known hardware manufacturer), and then they communicate over an authenticated and encrypted channel. Third, the gateway can enforce USB descriptor semantics, which means ensuring that the layers beyond the gateway will see an idealized, spec-compliant USB device. This would rule out more than half of the attacks on USB drivers in the CVE database [13] . Finally, the gateway can facilitate detection of higher-level threats: data exfiltration, intrusions, malware, etc.
These examples are analogous to, respectively, an organization's firewall (all Internet hosts are permitted to contact the organization's Web server, but only known hosts are permitted to contact print servers), a Virtual Private Network (VPN), a Deep Packet Inspector (DPI), and an intrusion or exfiltration detector.
We find Cinch to be practical and compatible with existing devices ( §5). Cinch's implementation is for Linux ( §4), but porting it requires implementing only a relatively small kernel driver (which already exists on Linux [124] ). Cinch allows for concise expression of policy: the use cases described above are implemented in tens of lines of code by chaining together modules from a small library. Furthermore, performance is not problematic: Cinch reduces bulk transfer throughput by 2% and delays interaction with devices by less than a millisecond.
Ultimately, Cinch is enabled-and inspired-by much prior work in peripherals management, hardware-assisted virtualization, privilege separation, and network security. We delve into this work in Section 2.3. For now, we simply state that Cinch's contributions are principally in its architecture; its mechanics are mostly borrowed. These contributions are:
• Cinch's view of peripherals as untrusted network endpoints, and the architecture that results from this perspective.
• The instantiation of that architecture, which targets a natural choke point in device driver stacks, and composes virtualization techniques with the many tools of network security.
• A concrete and deployable defense to existing attacks.
• The design and implementation of new functionality, which arises naturally in this architecture (and requires contortions to achieve under the status quo).
Cinch is not perfect ( §6). To begin with, it only shrinks, not eliminates, the attack surface exposed to devices. Notably, even after sanitization, a device can in principle attack the protected machine, say by exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in the idealized device's driver (or elsewhere in the kernel). On the other hand, under Cinch, the user can decide which devices get this opportunity. Furthermore, handling buggy drivers is a complementary effort ( §2.3); the goals of both are important, and they could be composed. Similarly, Cinch does not unilaterally defend against higher-level threats (exfiltration, malware, etc.); however, Cinch creates a platform by which one can borrow and deploy known responses from network security ( §3.2). Finally, some of Cinch's functionality requires changes within the device ecosystem.
Nevertheless, looking at the misbehavior that it rules out and the functionality that it enables, Cinch appears to be an improvement over the status quo. Furthermore, Cinch's high ratio of capabilities to mechanism suggests that sanitationvia-networking is indeed a useful abstraction. Perhaps this perspective on device security will have further benefits, allow other kinds of future research, or guide future bus design.
Background and related work
Commodity computers (phones, laptops, tablets, desktops, etc.) include, in various combinations, several peripheral buses for pluggable devices. These are USB [71, 72] , Firewire [1], and Thunderbolt [68] . Cinch focuses on USB as an initial target; we make this choice because USB is ubiquitous and complex, and because it has become a popular locus of hardwarebased attacks. However, the approach taken by Cinch applies to other buses. This section describes the USB "stack" (the hardware, protocol, and drivers), the attack space, and current defenses and related work.
Overview of USB
USB is a peripheral interconnect bus used for low-and medium-speed devices, and for power delivery. Bandwidth ranges from 1.5 Mb/s (USB1) to 5.0 Gb/s (USB3). Example devices include storage devices (including memory sticks), keyboards, sound cards, video cameras, and smart card readers. These devices connect to a host (for example, a laptop or desktop). Some computers can act as either a device or a host; for example, a smart phone or tablet can appear as a storage device (or power consumer) to a desktop, but as a host for portable keyboards. Figure 1 depicts the hardware and software architecture of USB.
USB hardware. USB is a tree topology. Each device has a point-to-point connection to a hub; hubs multiplex communication from one or more devices. A hub is itself a device, and connects either to another hub or to the root of the tree. The root of the tree is a host controller, which is physically on the host, and is connected to the host by, for example, PCIe. The host controller is the master of the entire tree: all transfers to and from devices are initiated by the host controller.
USB protocol. The USB specification [71, 72] defines an OSI-style networking stack. In particular, there are entities corresponding to all seven layers: Physical, Link, Network, Transport, Session, and Presentation. On a typical device, the lowest three layers (Physical, Link, and Network) are implemented in hardware; the other layers are implemented in firmware. The higher layers, especially the Presentation layer, define several generic device types, called device classes; for example, keyboards and mice are specified in the human interface device (HID) class. As a result of class definitions, a single class driver can control any compliant device.
USB drivers. The specification prescribes three levels of software abstractions on the host. We walk through these now, using their Linux names (and giving the USB specification names parenthetically).
The lowest level, the host controller interface or HCI (called HCDI in the USB specification), handles configuration of, and interaction with, the host controller over a local bus (e.g., PCIe). The HCI driver is comparable to the driver for a specific type of ethernet card. HCI presents raw frames to the next level, which is core (USBD in the USB specification). Core handles device addressing, power management, and hotplug, and allows higher-level drivers to interact with devices via the host controller.
The uppermost level, class, handles the presentation layer, and provides the interface between particular classes of devices and the rest of the operating system. A device's class determines which parts of the kernel the driver interfaces with. For example, the human interface class driver communicates with a kernel's input subsystem. Another example is that the mass storage class driver interfaces with the SCSI subsystem; this results from the USB specification, which mandates that mass storage devices use the SCSI protocol at the presentation layer.
Because the USB specification is so constrained, the driver stacks on all of the operating systems that we investigated (Linux, Windows, OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD, Dragonfly-BSD, OS X, Solaris) have essentially the architecture just described.
USB threats
USB-based attacks are not new: the security community has long been concerned about the ability of a device to automatically execute files upon attachment [80] [81] [82] , for example. However, the sophistication of threats has escalated in recent years. We do not know exactly why. Economics is likely a cause: creating custom USB devices is now very inexpensive, both in financial cost and development time [8, 59, 66, 73, 116, 117] . Popularity and press likely play a role too: demonstrating USB attacks has become somewhat fashionable. The recent media hullabaloo [5-7, 51, 67, 134] surrounding the disclosure and demonstration of USB firmware reprogramming [55, 103, 138] is a case in point.
Another factor is transmission: the idea that malicious USB devices could find their way into the hands of victims is no longer considered implausible. This is not because, say, conference organizers are malicious but because of vulnerabilities in the supply chain itself [50, 94, 119, 154] . For one thing, a manufacturer may be adversarial [120] . And intelligence agencies have been known to use their considerable resources to intercept and "enhance" shipments [27, 115] , including conference giveaways [20, 21] .
Whatever their causes, the threats are manifest (even without a tinfoil hat). We walk through them below.
Masquerading. When a device is plugged into a host, the host asks the device for information about its capabilities. The device can respond, disguised as another device or even another class [34, 53, 55, 79, 104, 136, 138, 159] . For example, Psychson [55] enables rewriting the firmware on a cheap USB storage device so that it will act like a keyboard; similarly, the commercially available "USB Rubber Ducky" [73] is a programmable keystroke injector designed to look like a flash drive. A malicious hub can likewise spoof other devices [26] . Penetration testers have reported regularly using such tools to breach security systems [2, 25] .
This class of attacks results, first, because the USB specification does not include an authentication mechanism: a device can claim to be whatever it wants. Second, the host has no way to validate the device's claims, since the host has no information about the user's expectations or intent. Third, most machines are configured for convenience: by default, a newly connected USB device immediately becomes "part of the machine."
Snooping. A malicious hub can record traffic from other devices to recover sensitive information [16, 92] . Furthermore, the hub itself need not be malicious; if its firmware is buggy, the bugs can be exploited by a malicious device that commandeers the hub [26].
One cause of these vulnerabilities is that, consistent with the context in which it was designed, the hardware standard does not build in privacy. Similarly, even though in principle devices could implement such functionality at the Presentation layer, in general they do not do so. Indeed, keyboards pass key strokes over the bus in cleartext. And even some security-oriented devices "trust the bus" (and the other devices): nominally secure storage devices pass encryption keys across the bus in cleartext [30, 31, 60, 61, 75, 76] , smart phones protect data using trivial obfuscation [47] , and physical authentication tokens use protocols that are vulnerable to replay [17, 140] .
Attacks on drivers. Host drivers present an attack surface to devices. We decompose attacks into two categories. First, a device can stay within the USB specification but exploit a driver's buggy implementation of the specification. There is a range of issues here (the usual ones when considering securitycritical bugs); improperly sized static buffers dominates [33, 35-39, 41, 43, 87] .
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, a device can deviate from the USB specification. The space of possible misbehaviors here is vast. As several examples, devices might try to deliver more data to the driver than indicated by the device's configuration [40] ; claim impossible configurations [83] [84] [85] [86] ; exceed limits prescribed by USB class specifications [28, 54, 62] ; or produce otherwise invalid or nonsensical reports [3, 42, 96, 105-107, 109, 150] .
The second category is particularly problematic, as it sets up a difficult software engineering situation. Namely, in order to write correct code in this environment, a driver writer needs to be prepared for an enormous range of behavior, none of it documented. This means that a driver needs a lot of error checking code, but of course error handling code is often ill-exercised and creates complexity, which leads to more bugs and vulnerabilities. Indeed, more than half of the vulnerabilities related to USB drivers in the CVE database [13] are the result of improper handling of noncompliant USB transfers; many more such vulnerabilities likely remain undisclosed [105, 150] .
Higher-level threats. USB devices may pose other threats to a host system. For example, an otherwise well-behaved USB thumb drive might be a vector for a virus, or an exploit for a non-USB-specific vulnerability [19, 57, 77, 78] ; or devices might be employed to covertly steal data [152] .
Related work
Cinch's contribution is not mechanistic but rather architectural: indeed, as noted in the introduction, many, if not all, of the mechanisms that Cinch incorporates are borrowed from prior works and existing areas of research. Nevertheless, no prior work that we are aware of addresses, or provides a platform for addressing, the space of attacks described in the prior section. Cinch, by contrast, provides a platform on which one can straightforwardly deploy responses to these threats.
USB security mechanisms (similar problem, different mechanisms). The threat of malicious hardware devices has not been lost on security practitioners and industry; several defenses exist.
One can purchase an adapter that prevents unwanted malware or data interchange on the USB bus, converting the bus into power lines only [65] . A software version of this protection is a set of Linux kernel patches known as grsecurity [24], which essentially disable hotplug. This "air gap ethos"-provide defense by eliminating connectivityconflicts with Cinch's aim of controlled interaction.
Qubes [58] is a distribution of Linux that makes extensive use of virtualization to create isolated privilege domains; applied to application isolation, it is very powerful. However, applied to our context, Qubes would have to place the entire USB bus in its own virtual machine; at this point, Qubes could export any USB storage devices as block devices, but Qubes does not support exporting non-storage USB devices. As a result, key strokes from the user's USB keyboard would be delivered to the USB virtual machine, and hence the user's applications would need to live on the virtual machine, and hence the threats enumerated in the previous section would be reprised-inside the virtual machine.
The udev user space daemon on Linux [70] implements finer-grained policies than Qubes; for instance, the user can specify that some devices are allowed and others are not. However, an issue with udev is that it can itself be attacked: to make policy decisions, udev requires the kernel to interact with every device that connects, even the ones that the user warned udev away from. That is, the device has an opportunity to attack the host machine before udev makes a policy decision. Beyond that, udev cannot be sure that a device is what it says it is, owing to the masquerading issue outlined in Section 2.2.
There are many commercial security offerings that also enable basic access control policies for USB devices [12, 14, 18, 22, 44, 46, 49, 63, 64, 69] . However, the issues with these are similar to udev: devices can attack the host during the initial interaction, before a policy decision is made; and devices may lie about their identity.
Finally, none of the preceding solutions rules out the semantic attacks of masquerading and snooping (as outlined in Section 2.2).
Device driver isolation and reliability (complementary problem, overlapping mechanisms). There is a vast literature on protecting against unreliable device drivers and on making them more reliable. Below, we go over some of this work, but we can only scratch the surface (a helpful survey appears in SUD [101] ).
We note at the outset that Cinch borrows mechanisms from many of these works: placing drivers in a separate virtual machine [111, 113, 130] , isolating a device with the IOMMU [32, 123] , and leveraging hardware-assisted I/O virtualization [98, 123, 130, 141, 157] . However, the threat, and thus the resulting architecture, is different. In particular, device driver reliability work either assumes that the devices work correctly or, at worst, are buggy (rather than malicious). Consequently, semantic attacks (masquerading, snooping, etc.) are out of scope; often, "specification deviation" attacks ( §2.2) are out of scope too. On the other hand, Cinch does not provide comprehensive protection against compromised drivers (though it can sanitize drivers' inputs, as outlined in Section 3.2). For this reason, the works covered below are complementary to-and in many cases composable with-Cinch.
Microkernels [93, 131, 162] and exokernels [110, 121] move device drivers to user space (or otherwise sandbox them [100] ), placing much of their logic in a separate privilege domain. As a result, the rest of the system is shielded from device driver problems. On the one hand, these works presume very different kernel architectures (versus our pragmatic focus); on the other hand, these works have been influential, and their ethos appears in many of the works below.
Much work has focused on isolating faulty device drivers [102, 111, 113, 114, 123, 129, 130, 142, [155] [156] [157] 161] ; for example, Nooks [156] places drivers in their own protection domain, and some works place drivers in user space [101, 102, 114, 123, 129, 142, 161] or virtual machines [111, 113, 130, 157] . However, this work typically assumes buggy drivers (rather than malicious ones), and explicitly assumes that the hardware is well-behaved. SUD [101] assumes malicious drivers but requires that the hardware obey its specification.
The Nexus [161] operating system interposes between drivers and devices, to validate the commands passed to devices; this relates to Cinch's use of interposition to make devices comply with the USB spec ( §3.2). The distinction is that in Cinch, the guarantees are enforced against the device, versus against the driver. Other work, such as Termite, synthesizes drivers that are correct by construction [145, 146] but assumes that devices obey their specification. Both Nexus and Termite use formal methods, and we are interested in applying similar techniques to enhancing and fortifying the Cinch module that enforces spec-compliance ( §3).
Dingo seeks to eliminate device driver bugs, but buggy hardware is out of scope [144] . Carburizer [126] aims at tolerating hardware faults, but such faults are assumed to be non-malicious and are generally constrained: Carburizer targets circuit-level faults (e.g., flipped bits) rather than the types of attacks outlined in Section 2.2. Nevertheless, Carburizer would also be a natural system to compose with Cinch.
Non-root I/O handling (different problem, overlapping mechanisms). Arrakis [141] , IX [98] , and ELI [118] use I/O virtualization hardware to efficiently expose devices to layers above the machine's operating system (some of these works are inspired by Dune [97] , which uses virtualization to safely expose privileged CPU operations). The goal of these systems was performance. Cinch also makes use of I/O virtualization mechanisms, but the goal and thus the resulting architecture is very different.
The Xen [95] VMM supports mapping a device into one VM and exporting functionality to other VMs [113] . The goal is sharing hardware across multiple guest OSes. Cinch uses a similar mechanism, mapping hardware to a VM and exporting functionality, but with a different goal.
Secure peripheral interaction (different problem, overlapping mechanisms). SeRPEnT [160] and Bumpy [137] focus on providing a safe pathway from input devices, through an untrusted host machine, to a trusted, remote machine. Like Cinch's security adapter ( §4) and corresponding authentication and privacy applications ( §3.2), these systems add authentication and encryption capabilities to peripheral devices. However, their setup and goals are different. Bumpy uses trusted execution hardware in the host machine to convince a remote machine that input from the user was correctly captured and relayed by the host's untrusted operating system. SeRPEnT establishes an encrypted tunnel directly to a trusted remote machine, protecting against tampering by the local machine.
Both of these are aimed at wide area networking. In contrast, Cinch delivers input through an untrusted bus to an endpoint on the host machine.
Wang et al [158] modify the USB protocol to allow a host to authenticate to a peripheral such as a smart phone (and, optionally, for the peripheral to authenticate to the host). The goal is to defend against masquerading threats ( §2.2) posed by untrusted hosts and devices. Cinch's security adapter ( §4) has a similar goal, but its mechanism does not require modification of the host's USB drivers.
Zhou et al [163] allow trusted applications running on top of untrusted operating systems to securely communicate with I/O devices. This is achieved through the use of a trusted hypervisor that mediates access to hardware by both the trusted and untrusted components. Cinch also interacts with peripheral devices via an untrusted intermediary, but the architecture, mechanisms, goals, and threat model are all different.
Separation kernels and network security (related problems, related mechanisms). Two other areas deserve special mention. The first is Rushby's separation kernel [143] , in which the operating system is architected to make different resources of the computer interact with each other as if they were members of a distributed system. The foundational observation of this work-that networks are an extremely useful abstraction for interposition-is one that we share. However, our goals and scenario are different. The separation kernel was intended to be a small kernel, with an implementation that could be formally verified, and it was intended to enforce information flow control. By contrast, our scenario is commodity operating systems, and we are seeking to apply tools from network security (which, while not as illustrious as information flow control, have been effective in practice).
This brings us to network security itself. Cinch owes a substantial debt to this field, borrowing as it does concepts like firewalls, deep packet inspection, and virtual private networks. Moreover, the recent trend toward Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [135, 151] applies I/O virtualization-as does Cinch and some of the works cited earlier-to create virtual middleboxes. Cinch's architecture and motivation is somewhat different: NFV is motivated by configurability and cost, and of course focuses on traditional networks, whereas Cinch aims to reimagine peripherals as untrusted network endpoints, and accordingly focuses on USB devices.
Design
To motivate the specific architectural choices made in Cinch, we begin by reviewing a distillation of the threats discussed in Section 2.2. Next, we describe the design of Cinch ( §3.1). To validate this design, we then describe applications that provide high-level responses to the discussed attacks. These applications demonstrate how Cinch leverages well-known solutions from network security ( §3.2).
Threat model. In building Cinch, we assume that the host computer's operating system and drivers are not malicious (though they may be buggy). We make the same assumptions about the computer's hardware except for the USB controller and USB devices. Devices can follow the USB specification, but violate the user's expectations, e.g., by masquerading as another device or passively intercepting bus traffic; devices can deviate arbitrarily from the USB specification in order to exploit faulty firmware or drivers; and devices can both follow the USB specification and behave as expected, but present a higher-level threat (e.g., a storage device that carries a virus, or is used to steal data).
Architecture and instantiation
In the context of networking, it is well understood how to respond to these threats; there is an effective toolbox honed through years of experience. For example, servers that are not hardened for exposure to malicious clients are protected by packet drops, while hardened servers might be placed on a logically distinct network. Network traffic is examined during routing to detect suspicious activity, prevent attacks, and detect viruses. And confidential information is routinely exchanged over public networks, using protocols like SSL to ensure authenticity and privacy.
The contrast between the detailed responses available in the network setting and the paucity of options for USB raises a natural question: how can we adopt these techniques in the USB context? More specifically, in the context of the USB bus, where and how can we create something akin to a physical separation between the bus and the host, while arranging to pass packets between them?
We begin with the "where." Cinch inserts a Gateway module between the USB host controller hardware and the host controller interface level of the driver stack ( Fig. 1,  §2 .1). With this narrow choke point, it is straightforward for the Gateway to inspect (and even modify) all USB traffic.
Next, we describe the "how." Cinch decomposes interaction with USB devices into two machines. One, the red machine, connects to the untrusted USB devices. The other, the blue machine, is the host machine that we wish to protect; the Gateway is placed at the "entrance" to the blue machine.
Finally, we state how packets enter this picture. Given the placement of the Gateway and given the logical separation of machines, Cinch arranges for the following: all traffic from USB devices on the red machine is captured by a special USB class driver ( §4), encapsulated in IP, and sent to the blue machine via a logical network connection between the two machines. The Gateway sits on this logical connection. From this vantage point, it can inspect all traffic to and from USB devices and make policy decisions (e.g., dropping or rewriting packets).
This architecture can be instantiated using virtualization; the advent of near-ubiquitous virtualization support in commodity Hardware virtualization provided by the IOMMU isolates the USB host controller from the blue machine, redirecting DMA and interrupts to the red machine. The red machine encapsulates USB packets in IP and forwards them to the Gateway, which can manipluate those packets according to highlevel policies. After processing by the Gateway, a driver on the blue machine de-encapsulates USB packets, which can then be handled by the blue machine's unmodified USB driver stack. hardware and operating systems ( §2.3) makes this plausible. 2 As depicted in Figure 2 , Cinch confines interaction with the USB hardware to the red machine by leveraging I/O virtualization hardware (which we discuss immediately below); the red machine's only interface to the blue machine is via a virtual network device.
Cinch leverages hardware support for I/O virtualization [89, 91] . This support provides two functions: an IOMMU and interrupt remapping. An IOMMU provides both DMA address translation (allowing mapping of DMA into a guest OS) and DMA isolation (providing memory protection at page granularity for DMA transfers) [99] . This allows a VMM to delegate responsibility for DMA-capable hardware to a guest OS, and ensure that the hardware is restricted to reading and writing only in the guest's memory. Interrupt remapping provides analogous isolation and translation for interrupts. The result is that a guest OS can be given direct control over hardware while isolating that hardware from the VMM and other guests.
This arrangement has a number of desirable properties. To begin with, the use of hardware-assisted virtualization gives good performance. Also, Cinch reuses existing hardware and drivers. In particular, Cinch requires only a relatively small kernel modification on both the red machine and the blue machine; namely, each requires a driver that encapsulates USB in IP. Finally, the interface between the red machine and the blue 2 Of course, another possibility is a hardware solution; we could introduce a device positioned between the USB host controller and the blue machine. With proper design, a hardware Gateway might require little or no software modification on the host. On the other hand, a software-only solution that leverages existing hardware offers greater flexibility. machine directly leverages networking protocols. One consequence is that Cinch benefits from the robustness of existing implementations (notably the hardened IP stack). Another is that Cinch can apply existing networking techniques naturally; we turn to sample applications now.
Example applications of Cinch
In this section, we present a variety of applications of Cinch that exhibit the high-level policy goals that Cinch can be used to enforce. Taken together, these applications demonstrate that Cinch can be used to provide a comprehensive response to the security threats described in Section 2.2. To be clear, these threats can be addressed individually by existing mechanisms ( §2.3); it might also be possible to combine subsets of these mechanisms in an ad hoc way. However, Cinch provides a unified framework in which existing mechanisms compose cleanly, and in some cases provides stronger guarantees than previous techniques. We believe that the wide scope and simplicity of the implementation of these applications validate the design of Cinch.
Hotplug policies. One defense against malicious devices is strictly limiting which devices may connect to a host machine. For example, a user might want to • charge a phone without enabling any device functionality; or
• receive a notification when a new device is plugged in, before the host computer interacts with the device, and decide whether to allow or deny a device; or
• sandbox new storage devices in a VM, where the contents can be scanned for viruses.
All of these policies are supported by Cinch. Like a network firewall, Cinch examines (and potentially modifies or reroutes) all USB traffic before it reaches the blue machine. As a result, it can choose to entirely drop packets associated with disallowed devices, or ask for user intervention when a new device attempts to send packets. Importantly, the blue machine never interacts with devices that are disallowed.
Alternatively, Cinch can reroute USB traffic intended for the blue machine to a VM. In addition to scanning storage for viruses, the VM might more generally re-export a limited subset of the device's functionality to the blue machine. For example, a USB storage device's files might be exported using an NFS or HTTP server, leveraging heavily tested interfaces to guard against attacks on the blue machine's disk or filesystem drivers.
Finally, Cinch can achieve fine-grained control by applying techniques akin to deep packet inspection. Specifically, Cinch can rewrite traffic corresponding to a particular device to remove disallowed functionality while allowing permissible interactions. For example, a user might wish to read data from a USB stick but disallow writes. When no storage devices are permitted on the blue machine-e.g., because the machine processes sensitive information-this device presents a problem for coarse hotplug mechanisms: either the device is entirely blocked (disallowing functionality that would otherwise be permissible), or the device is allowed (violating the prohibition on storage devices). In contrast, Cinch can apply hotplug policies at a fine grain, allowing or disallowing individual functions of a device.
Authentication and privacy. Sensitive traffic sent over USB is vulnerable to masquerading and snooping attacks ( §2.2). Keyboards are a primary point of concern: on the one hand, a malicious hub could function as a keylogger. On the other, any device could pretend to be a keyboard and issue malicous commands. To prevent this, we would like to permit only authorized keyboards and have them communicate over secured channels.
These kinds of attacks are very familiar in the networking context, and are handled by techniques to provide authorization and privacy. For example, SSL channels and VPNs serve to protect traffic from listeners and prevent unauthorized participants from injecting traffic. Cinch enables the direct application of network security techniques. For instance, the Gateway (on behalf of the blue machine) can initiate a connection with a device using existing TLS and SSL libraries ( §4). This affords the blue machine and device mutual authentication, and thereafter provides cryptographic assurance of privacy and integrity of data. Critically, since Cinch's approach terminates the protocol on the Gateway, the blue machine does not need to have modified drivers.
Of course, implementing such protocols with Cinch does require modified devices, which results in redesign effort as well as additional cryptographic overhead on the device. However, abundant support for rapid development of embedded cryptographic applications [45, 48, 88] coupled with the speed of modern embedded processors substantially mitigates these concerns. Notably, our evaluation of a "security adapter" ( §4) suggests that good performance can be achieved with little implementation effort.
Ensuring standards compliance. Malicious devices that do not follow the USB specification can exploit vulnerable drivers, leading to privilege escalation ( §2.2). Unfortunately, many non-malicious devices also fail to comply with the spec; this motivates driver writers to accommodate non-compliant devices. 3 In contrast, a user might be motivated to treat particular devices with suspicion, choosing incompatibility rather than vulnerability, since doing so substantially reduces the drivers' attack surface ( §2.2). Hotplug policies (discussed above) are related to, but do not solve, this problem: hotplug policy decisions occur at connection time, whereas standards compliance remains a concern until the device is disconnected.
Of course, in general it is a hard problem to ensure compliance by rewriting packets, but Cinch can enforce a range of 3 As evidence for this, we note that (1) the word "quirk" appears about once every 300 lines throughout the 300kLoC Linux USB stack, and (2) almost all of the devices we tested deviated from the standard in at least a small way.
compliance policies, on a per-device basis. For instance, if a device sends an invalid identification string (which does not impact functionality but can cause errors [3] ), Cinch can replace the string. If the device sends uninterpretable responses to commands from the host, Cinch can replace with an error response or force the device to disconnect. As with the finegrained control example above, this enforcement is achieved with techniques that are analogous to deep packet inspection.
Intrusion and data exfiltration detection. Many corporate and government policies proscribe the use of USB memory devices. Motivating concerns include the spread of malicious software and the theft of sensitive data. For example, a malicious device might install a virus or copy the contents of host memory. However, anecdotal reports suggest that the official proscriptions are honored more in the breach than the observance. Tools for handling analogous problems in the networking context exist and are widely deployed [122, 132, 133, 147, 148] . However, since USB is "inside" a host, in the past it has been considered difficult to erect a boundary and detect data theft [152] . Cinch makes it natural for administrators to apply techniques from the networking literature to detect intrusions and prevent data exfiltration. In particular, Cinch provides the ability to monitor all USB traffic and identify attack signatures or statistically anomalous events. Furthermore, since Cinch encapsulates USB packets in IP, the analysis of traffic need not be local to a single machine: Cinch can forward traffic to a remote server where it can be processed by services like CloudAV [139] or SIDD [132] . This enables a response to intrusion and data exfiltration that is unified across USB and network traffic.
Dealing with untrusted USB sticks. Working in concert, the applications described above allow a conference attendee to safely get data from a USB stick. The USB filesystem is mounted in a sandbox and scanned for viruses. An authentication policy prevents the stick from mounting spoofing attacks. And the compliance sanitization eliminates some of the risk of direct driver attacks. application ( §3.2) modeled misbehavior desired policy Cinch policy hotplug malicious charging device triggers driver bug [159] allow device only power 35 lines hotplug malicious USB stick triggers file system bug [78] attach device in sandbox 35 lines authentication storage device masquerades as keyboard [138] allow device only as storage 39 lines privacy compromised hub snoops on keyboard [16] traffic from keyboard is private 36 lines compliance non-compliant device triggers driver bug [54] sanitize USB descriptors 35 lines exfiltration user exports sensitive data sanitize output, log incident 37 lines intrusion detection user types admin password replace typed password, log incident 37 lines FIGURE 3-Panel of misbehaviors used in our evaluation, along with the desired policy, and the number of lines of Click [127] configuration that Cinch requires to enforce that policy. All Cinch policies share 31 lines of common configuration for routing packets from the red machine.
Carrying USB in the network. For encapsulating and decapsulating USB over IP, Cinch uses USB/IP [124] , which has been part of the mainline Linux kernel since version 3.17. USB/IP allows a source machine (in Cinch, the red machine) to share its hardware with a destination machine (in Cinch, the blue machine). USB/IP includes a class driver on the source, and an HCI driver on the destination that emulates the behavior of the USB root hub and interacts with the destination's unmodified USB core driver ( §2.1). This enables the source's hardware to appear seamlessly as a USB device on the destination (Fig. 2,  §3.1) . The source driver communicates with the destination driver by tunneling USB data over TCP. USB/IP originally enabled sharing devices over a network (e.g., allowing access to a printer connected to a remote machine); in Cinch, we use it to allow the Gateway to interpose on USB traffic. USB/IP presently lacks support for USB 3 devices; our prototype implementation inherits this limitation.
Gateway. The Gateway is built atop the Click software router [127] , and leverages both existing Click elements (packet processing modules, e.g., packet classification, queuing, TCP checksumming) and several new elements that we built to operate on USB/IP-encapsulated traffic. These new elements implement functionality such as USB device classification, SSL connection management, logging, specification compliance testing, and matching and rewriting raw USB data. The Gateway's operation is controlled by a Click configuration file, in which a user describes the required high-level behavior (e.g., "disallow keyboards") by selecting a set of Click elements and element-specific parameters. In total, Cinch's USB-specific Click elements comprise roughly 2100 lines of C++; the SSL element relies on OpenSSL [52] for cryptographic operations.
Prototype authentication / privacy hardware. Providing authentication and privacy requires additional features on the peripheral device itself. To demonstrate these features in Cinch, we implemented a USB device for providing authentication and privacy, a security adapter, which allows existing devices to use authentication and encryption ( §3.2). The security adapter interposes between one or more USB input devices (e.g., a keyboard or a mouse) and a (physical) USB port. For each attached device, the security adapter establishes an au-thenticated and encrypted channel with the Gateway, through which the attached device and the blue machine communicate. We built the security adapter using a BeagleBone Black [8] , a single-board computer with an ARM Cortex-A8 processor.
Evaluation
In this Section we evaluate Cinch's ability to enforce policies for USB devices ( §5.1) and Cinch's costs ( §5.2).
Our experimental framework is inspired by Facedancer [116] , a USB adapter that allows any computer to masquerade as a device; our implementation of this platform is based on a Silicon Labs USB microcontroller [9] . All experiments use a commodity machine equipped with a 3.3 GHz Intel i5-4590 quad-core processor, 16 GB of 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM, and an ASRock H97M Pro4 Motherboard. Some of our experiments also use a prototype security adapter ( §4).
What are the policies that Cinch can enforce?
We evaluate Cinch's ability to enforce several USB policies for each of the application classes described in Section 3.2. To do this, we use a panel of seven misbehaviors of USB devices and users, each of which violates some high-level policy. Figure 3 describes this panel.
Hotplug policies. We evaluate Cinch's ability to enforce hotplug policies by implementing a faulty USB driver that crashes the blue machine whenever a specific USB device is plugged in. We implement two policies in Cinch: (1) allow unknown devices to receive power only, and (2) attach the problematic device in a sandbox VM. The first policy ensures that an unknown device can receive power, but is unable to affect the blue machine. Specifically, the policy states that an unknown device's traffic should be dropped, and that the device should be presented to the blue machine as a dummy device incapable of performing I/O but able to draw power; this is done by rewriting the device's descriptor during the device enumeration process. The second policy routes all USB packets to the sandbox VM, which attaches the device.
For each of the two policies above we run experiments where we plug in the problematic device and observe the blue machine and the sandbox VM. We find that Cinch's policies are effective: with the power-only policy the device receives power (confirmed by measuring power output with a mobile phone); with the sandbox policy, only the sandbox VM crashes (not the blue machine). We also confirm that without Cinch, connecting the device causes the blue machine to crash.
Each of these policies requires 35 lines of Click to implement; 31 of these lines are shared among all policies and are used for routing traffic from the red machine. These policies highlight the flexibility of Cinch: the blue machine can make a per-device decision about its policy when attaching an untrusted device (i.e., whether to allow a device power or examine it in a sandbox).
Authentication and privacy. We evaluate Cinch's ability to enforce authentication policies by using a USB storage device configured to reconnect and masquerade as a keyboard after 10 seconds. Our chosen policy allows input devices to attach to the blue machine only if they are using the security adapter ( §4). Specifically, the Gateway attempts an SSL handshake with the security adapter and allows the blue machine to attach a human input device (e.g., a keyboard) only when such device presents a valid certificate (we assume an existing chain of trust, e.g., a list of trusted manufacturers and their public keys).
Our experiment consists of attaching the masquerading USB device and observing the blue machine. Under Cinch, the device cannot reconnect as a keyboard, even though it successfully attaches as a storage device. In contrast, without Cinch the device can send arbitrary keystrokes to the blue machine.
We evaluate Cinch's ability to provide privacy for input devices by configuring a BeagleBone Black [8] to act as a compromised hub and snoop on the traffic of attached devices. Our policy states that devices attached via the security adapter are required to use an encrypted channel.
To test Cinch's mechanisms, we run an experiment where we plug a keyboard into the compromised hub with and without the security adapter, and we observe the keystrokes captured by the compromised hub. Using Cinch and the security adapter, the compromised hub sees (seemingly) random characters because traffic from the keyboard is encrypted. Without Cinch, the compromised hub sees all traffic from the keyboard.
The policies for authentication and privacy take 39 and 36 lines of Click configuration, respectively; the Click element responsible for serving as an SSL endpoint and enforcing these policies is written in 500 lines of C++ (excluding OpenSSL [52]). These experiments show that Cinch (along with prototype hardware) provides mechanisms to prevent snooping and masquerading attacks.
Standards compliance. We evaluate Cinch's ability to enforce standards compliance by using 1,000 test cases generated by a fuzz testing tool [106] . These test cases correspond to USB requests with different invalid parameters (e.g., request types, buffer sizes, device ids); the test cases represent a wide range of USB devices including: audio, networking, input, printers, storage, and smart cards. We implement one policy in Cinch: whenever a malformed packet is found, Cinch replaces it with a packet that the blue machine handles as a no-op. As described in Section 3.2, Cinch could also drop the packet or reset the device. We chose to replace the offending packet with a no-op for two reasons: (a) this action was handled more quickly by the blue machine's device drivers than resetting the device, and (b) dropping a packet often causes the blue machine to block until a long timeout triggers.
For each test case, we simulate in software a USB device that interacts with the Gateway directly. We choose this approach in favor of programming a microcontroller in the desired configuration and connecting it via the red machine, which is our method in all other experiments. This is because the red machine's USB stack performs some basic sanitization, i.e., it rejects some invalid requests, while our goal is to demonstrate the Gateway's ability to present a standards-compliant device to the blue machine despite these invalid requests. We find that the Gateway re-writes all malformed USB requests before they reach the blue machine.
The specification compliance policy takes 35 additional lines of Click; about 600 lines of C++ make up the compliance element in the Gateway. These experiments highlight that Cinch can be used to enforce invariants on device packets, making them "well-behaved" to the blue machine, and that these invariants can be enforced at a narrow choke point.
Data exfiltration and intrusion detection. We evaluate
Cinch's ability to apply policies according to the contents of USB packets by attempting to infiltrate and exfiltrate sensitive data to and from USB devices. We implement one policy in Cinch: if a sensitive string (e.g., a private key, an administrator password, or a sensitive file) appears in USB traffic, rewrite that string and notify an administrator. The policy relies on a Gateway element that exposes a match-and-replace interface that can be invoked and configured through parameters in a Click configuration file.
We run two experiments to demonstrate the efficacy of this policy. In the first experiment, we attempt to transfer a file containing a sensitive string; in the second experiment, we type an administrator password on a keyboard. In each experiment, we find that Cinch's policy is effective: the sensitive string is removed from output (or input), and in both cases Cinch executes a shell script-specified as a configuration parameter-that logs the event. Without Cinch's policy, we are able to transfer the secret and type in the password.
This policy requires 37 lines of Click to express, and the underlying USB data match and manipulation element, which performs basic string matching, is implemented in 320 lines of C++. A more sophisticated implementation could draw from the deep packet inspection literature (e.g., [128, 153] ).
What are the costs of Cinch?
We examine two aspects of Cinch's costs: (1) the resource overheads of processing USB packets and the resulting impact on device throughput, and (2) What are Cinch's resource overheads? Cinch consumes system resources to analyze the contents of USB packets, and it affects overall device throughput. To measure these overheads, we run an experiment in which we transfer 100 MB of data from a commodity flash drive, and we record the throughput of the transfer along with the resource usage at the blue machine. We repeat this experiment 20 times for each of the policies in Figure 3 that work without the security adapter (currently the security adapter only supports human interface devices like keyboards and mice). Figure 4 shows the results. The CPU overhead of Cinch is modest, averaging 5.5% of the CPU's cycles across all policies. The policies required for the exfiltration and intrusion detection applications have the highest CPU overhead because they rely on the device classification and specification compliance Click elements (as do all other policies), but additionally inspect every byte of a packet's payload. Memory use is roughly constant across all policies, since the overhead is dominated by the red machine's VM which takes up 130 MB. We think this overhead is acceptable, since it is, for example, comparable to the memory used by a single browser tab showing Facebook, as reported by Google's Chrome browser [23] . Reading from the USB device with Cinch reduces throughput by 4.3 Mbps on average (2% of the maximum throughput achieved by the baseline). This degradation is due to increased latency in handling USB requests since the transfer protocol for USB mass storage can only have a single request in-flight [74] ; we discuss the increased latency next.
Is Cinch's added delay acceptable? Cinch's processing adds additional delay when servicing USB requests, which is important to keep low for input devices like mice and keyboards. To measure the additional delay introduced by Cinch, we configure the security adapter to act as an echo server for USB requests generated by the blue machine. We measure the round-trip time when the server and blue machine communicate using USB directly (status quo), and progressively adding the components of Cinch's implementation ending with the authenticated channel ( §4). Figure 5 depicts the results. Each component of Cinch adds additional delay to the round-trip time, with the maximum additional delay of 580 µs when using the authenticated and encrypted channel. We believe that this additional delay is acceptable for input devices, as even high-performance mechanical keyboards generally require a delay of about 5 ms between successive keystrokes for debouncing [90, 125] . 
Discussion
Cinch was motivated by two observations. First, the state of peripheral device security has become concerning (we want to be able to plug in marketing swag!). Second, networking has long had practical tools by which users and organizations could protect themselves while existing in a hostile landscape. The confluence of these observations is not terribly surprising, in that the Internet itself, decades ago, underwent the kind of (anti)socialization that we see happening in peripheral devices.
Recall that the Internet used to be a community of mutually trusting organizations and users; the types of boxes that exist in today's network security landscape would have been in bad taste. Then the mid-1990s happened, and it became economically feasible for vast numbers of people to join the Internet, at which point security became an issue. We are seeing something similar with hardware peripherals in that, today, it is far less expensive to create a plug and play peripheral device than it was even five years ago. Although Cinch's individual mechanisms have ample precedent in the literature, the architecture and the synthesis is novel (to the best of our knowledge). Moreover, as the evaluation results make clear, the implementation is pragmatic and surprisingly powerful. Looking at this fact, we feel comfortable stating that we have identified a good abstraction for the problem at hand.
To be clear, we are not saying that Cinch uniquely enables any one piece of its functionality ( §3.2); rather, the abstraction makes it natural to develop and deploy what would require far more work under alternative solutions ( §2.3).
We are also not saying that Cinch is comprehensive. First, its authentication and privacy mechanisms require changes to the device ecosystem: certificates for authentication, and modifications to hardware. On the other hand, these certificates are compatible with the chain of trust inherent in purchasing hardware to begin with (and trust could be bootstrapped by asking the user for input, in analogy with the permissions model on mobile devices), and the hardware modifications are not onerous, as our implementation of the functionality ( §4) indicates.
Second, its sanitization mechanism is not formally verified and may benefit from further enhancement. On the other hand, the protections provided would rule out large classes of vulnerabilities ( §3.2). Third, its defense against exfiltration requires composing with existing network security solutions. Last, a comprehensive solution would also include work on driver reliability and protection ( §2.3), but Cinch could be composed with a number of these solutions.
Despite these issues, Cinch does appear to be a substantial improvement over the status quo. Of course, it is possible that, if Cinch were widely deployed, it would only escalate an arms race, and drive attackers to find ever more esoteric vulnerabilities. On the other hand, security is always about building higher fences, and the considerations at the heart of our work could guide the future design of peripheral buses and drivers.
